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Abstract
Capital structure decision is considered one of most debated topics in corporate finance,
being several theories and empirical studies developed since the irrelevance of financing
decisions in value creation of the firm with Modigliani and Miller (1958).
Notwithstanding, the puzzle of firm’s financial resources is still unsolved (Myers,
2001), and there is not a single theory capable of incorporating all the determinants in
this dynamic process (Frank and Goyal, 2009).
For this reason, the present dissertation aims to introduce a corporate strategy approach
in the capital structure decision, focusing on Product and Geographic Diversification.
Using a sample of 35 Portuguese listed companies, from 2003 until 2013, static panel
data models were developed for three Leverage measures – Total Debt Ratio, Long-
term Debt Ratio and Short-term Debt Ratio – as dependent variables, being Product
Diversification and Geographic Diversification introduced as explanatory variables.
The results evidence that Product Diversification is not significant in explaining
Leverage ratios. Alongside, some findings support that Total Debt and Short-term Debt
Ratios exhibit a non-linear inverted U-shape relationship with Geographic
Diversification.
Key-words: capital structure, corporate strategy, financing decisions, product
diversification, geographic diversification, panel data models.
JEL-Codes: C23, G30, G32.
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11. Introduction
The present study investigates the impact of the degree of Diversification Strategies on
financial sources, and whether Product and Geographic Diversification are significant
determinants of listed Portuguese companies’ capital structure.
Since de 50’s, it has been widely discussed what are the determinants of capital
structure. These decisions have raised a significant amount of theories and empirical
researches in order to investigate this complex process. Modern theory began the puzzle
holding the irrelevance of financing decisions in value creation of the firm with
Modigliani and Miller (1958). In the following years, some assumptions of this initial
perspective were removed, emerging other theories to complement the determinants of
the firms’ financial resources.
1.1 General Background
Relaxing some Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumptions, the Trade-off theory argues
that capital structure results from the trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt,
being tax deductible interest expenses an advantage, against the fixed debt obligations
as a detrimental variable (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976).
Myers and Majluf (1984) developed the Pecking Order theory based on asymmetric
information, in which managers prefer internal sources, and when external financing is
required, debt has priority over equity.
From the Agency Costs theory perspective, debt is a disciplinary mechanism, able of
controlling the available cash-flows and managers discretionary behaviour; nonetheless,
leverage increases the default probability, being also a trade-off to take into account in
the debt level decision (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Under Market Timing theory presented by Baker and Wurgler (2002), the capital
structure is a cumulative outcome of attempts to explore the market opportunities,
without an optimal solution.
The empirical research developed in the field has found results that can be admitted in
the several theories, but not being explained through one single perspective. This fact
2was exposed with Frank and Goyal (2009) extensive study over half a century for
American companies, being pointed out weaknesses in the main theories of capital
structure in explaining the findings achieved.
1.2 Objectives and Motivations
None of the theories appear alone to be more imperative than other. This environment
opens an area of research for which it is useful to conduct additional studies to
investigate the debt/equity mix. It became relevant to combine some other inputs,
provided by management and strategic scholar, incorporating the role of the strategy in
this complex process (Barton and Gordon, 1987). This is the main motivation of the
current study that focuses on the specific case of Diversification Strategies (Product and
Geographic) impact on financial sources.
The effect of such strategies on capital structure is a product of three factors – i) the
Coinsurance Effect, through the imperfect correlation of cash-flows from the diversified
activities, implying a decrease of the operational risks, which increases the debt
capacity (Lewellen, 1971; Kim and McConnell, 1977; Bergh, 1997); ii) the Transaction
costs in case of bankruptcy, having diversified firms also diversified assets, being more
easily disposed, increasing the collateral provided to debtholders, which ultimately
allows to obtain more debt (Williamson, 1988; Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Kochhar
and Hitt, 1998); and iii) the Agency Costs, proceeding from the fact that more disperse
activities increase their monitoring costs and asymmetric information, reducing debt
capacity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Kochhar, 1996).
A second and also important reason to develop the study is that empirical studies have
examined the Diversification Strategies determinants on capital structure (e.g. Barton
and Gordon (1988), Kochhar and Hitt (1998), Menendez-Alonso (2003), Singh, et al.
(2003), Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) and Joliet and Muller (2013)) in other
countries, but not in Portugal, which is a gap in the literature. Our study is therefore a
contribution for the literature in this matter.
We also took advantage of the recent economic downturn to explore those determinants
in such an environment.
3The methodology adopted was grounded in multiple regressions techniques applied to
panel data, as similar studies in the field (Barton and Gordon, 1988; Kochhar and Hitt,
1998; Menendez-Alonso, 2003; Singh, et al., 2003; Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004;
Frank and Goyal, 2009).
1.3 Structure of the study
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the major capital
structure theories, being also focused in the relationship of capital structure and
diversification strategies. Section 3 introduces the related studies, exposing the
empirical evidence available in the literature. Section 4 discusses the research questions
and the respective methodology employed in our study. Section 5 gives details of the
data used in our study and sampling procedures, along with the sample characterization.
Section 6 reports the empirical results. Finally, the study concludes in Section 7 with the
main findings, limitations and suggestions for future research.
42. Theoretical Background
To provide the theoretical background on the field of capital structure and also
diversification strategies, firstly we present a general overview of the main theories of
capital structure in section 2.1, followed by some specific theoretical explanations of the
relationship between Capital Structure and Diversification Strategies in section 2.2.
2.1 Major Capital Structure Theories
It has been widely discussed, since many years, the value relevance of financing
decisions. Modigliani and Miller (1958) started this long journey, giving the theoretical
insights followed by many authors (e.g. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Ross (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987)
and Baker and Wurgler (2002)).
2.1.1 Modigliani and Miller Model
Modigliani and Miller (1958) began the capital structure puzzle holding the irrelevance
of financing decisions in value creation of the firm. However, as it is referred by the
authors, some drastic simplifications were put in place to face the dilemma – such as, no
taxes, no transaction and bankruptcy costs, symmetric information, rationality of
investors and homogeneous expectations – creating a perfect, but not real and feasible,
market scenario.
Miller (1977) puts a spotlight on taxes with the aim of introducing some real aspects to
the theory above, since interests represent a tax deductible expense, creating gains for
any company subject to tax-paying. Notwithstanding, even with this improvement, if
interest tax shields are effectively firm value creators, it wasn’t enough to explain why
capital structure were not exclusively composed by debt (Myers, 1984).
Furthermore, Miller (1977) establishes an equilibrium of aggregate supply and demand
for corporate debt, along with and an equilibrium debt-equity ratio for the corporate
sector as a whole, but with no optimum debt ratio for any individual firm. In this
equilibrium state, the value of the firm will be again independent of the debt and equity
scheme, since the taxes of the personal income by the managerial investor in corporate
5debt, will offset the corporate tax saving. Therefore and considering that different
investors have different taxes rates, firms will issue debt as long as the benefit is
positive, i.e. until the marginal balance between benefits and costs of debt are positive.
2.1.2 Trade-off Theory
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) introduced new pieces in the puzzle with Static Trade-
off Theory, combining two market imperfections – taxation of corporate profits and the
existence of bankruptcy penalties. The model developed demonstrates that the levered
firm value results from the unlevered firm market value, plus the tax advantage of debt,
deducted of corporate tax rate times the present value of bankruptcy costs. In this
framework, the tax advantage allows a higher after-tax operating income, however, it is
limited with legal obligation of fixed payments to debtholders, that when not met could
represent penalties and possibly force into bankruptcy.
Scott (1976) also present an optimal capital structure model, being under the
assumptions that bankruptcy is possible and the secondary markets for assets are
imperfect. It also refers that debt is valuable, as interest payments are tax deductible, to
the extent that level of debt implies higher probability of occurrence of insolvency
costs. In addition, the author also argues that an increase in the liquidation value of the
firm’s assets, collateral for debt obligations, reduces the costs of going bankrupt and
consequently, will allow a higher level of debt.
In this way, Trade-off Theory sustains moderate debt ratios, putting out of scope
established, profitable companies with superior credit ratings, operating historically at
low debt ratios (Myers, 2001). Despite this weakness, the theory is consistent with the
fact that companies holding higher slices of safe and tangible assets will borrow more
than riskier companies with higher proportions of intangible assets, which offer an
unsteady collateral to debtholders (Myers, 2001).
In order to innovate the static method of Trade-off Theory, Hennessy and Whited (2005)
formulate a theory where capital structure decisions are defined simultaneous with
investment decisions, enriching the previous approach with more dynamism in the
process. They found evidence to support the inexistence of a target debt ratio,
presenting variation in tax parameters as powerful explanatory variable of some
6anomalies in the expected capital structure decision behaviour from the traditional
Trade-off Theory point of view.
2.1.3 Pecking Order Theory
Moving forward with this unsolved puzzle, another milestone to consider is the Pecking
Order Theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), introducing a model based on previous studies
concerning financing practices developed by Donaldson (1961) and asymmetric
information. Contrasting with Trade-off Theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) have
presented a model to explain some aspects of the corporate behaviour, such as the
preference for internal sources and the prioritization of debt over equity, when external
financing is required. The two key points of the theory are i) the costs of relying on
external financing, since it would represent a separation of ownership and control,
implying a subordination of managers to the capital markets and ii) the advantage of
debt over equity caused by the asymmetric information effect, since raising equity to
finance investments could be perceived by the market as a sing of stocks overvaluation,
as managers have more information, expecting an higher rate of return and
consequently, increasing the cost of equity.
Therefore, the Pecking Order Theory overcomes the Trade-off Theory explaining why
profitable firms borrow less, considering that those firms will have more internal funds
available, than less profitable ones. It also gives theoretical insights that help explain
why debt is the preferred source of external financing, on the grounds that managers
will avoid underpricing consequences of issuing new equity to finance projects, being
debt more appealing. Nonetheless, the theory does not address the possibility of using
financial tactics in order to balance the managers’ superior information, and the optimal
capital structure goal is overshadowed by the costs of external financing.
Other authors (e.g. Harris and Raviv (1991) and Heinkel and Zechner (1990)) also
explain capital structure decisions driven by new investments cash-flows and the effect
of asymmetric information on the process.
To outside investors, the only investment information obtained regarding investment
decisions of the firms is if certain project is taken. Under this information asymmetry, it
is not possible to outside investors disaggregate a firm on its net present value projects
7(Harris and Raviv, 1991). So, there is a window opportunity to overinvestment, since
securities of the firm are valued by outside investors through the average project quality
(Narayanan, 1988) and consequently, overpriced equity could be used to finance
negative NPV projects. Knowing this, Heinkel and Zechner (1990) introduced a model
to formulate an initial capital structure with an optimal level of debt that leads to the
best subsequent investment policies - reduces the overinvestment financed through
overvalued equity and at the same time, does not limited the available cash flows in
such order that could lead to underinvestment policies. Their results suggest an optimal
capital structure in the initial moment, with a debt/equity mix that generates the first
best firm value-maximizing result of investment policy in the next time period, when
managerial decisions have to be taken.
2.1.4 Signalling Models
The underinvestment problem present by Myers and Majluf (1984) is addressed by
other authors, but resolved through a richer set of financing options than straight debt
over equity, invalidating in some cases the results of Pecking Order Theory (Brennan
and Kraus, 1987; Noe, 1988; Constantinides and Grundy, 1989).
Brennan and Kraus (1987) establish a value-revealing signalling equilibrium of the
financing choice characterized by a theorem based on the lemon property, which sets
that each financing strategy is chosen by the worst possible type of firm from the
investor’s point of view and consequently, the net claim will be the lowest true and full-
information value. Firms will try to maximize the lag between the price of its financing
choice and its true value. Although, if investors will price financing choice at its worst
case value, firms will be induce to choose the worst-case financing strategies, since
other alternative choice will imply a negative difference the true value of financing
choice and its price. Along these lines, the financing strategy is a signal of the
characteristics of the firm (Brennan and Kraus, 1987), being equity issue a negative
signal, but on the other hand, issuing equity to repurchase debt a positive signal.
In the scope of asymmetric information, other models with fixed investment give to
capital structure the role of signalling private information (Ross, 1977; Heinkel, 1982;
Poitevin, 1989; Hillier, et al., 2011).
8Ross (1977) develops a model in which profitability and debt-equity ratio are positively
related, being debt a signalling mechanism used by managers of high-quality firms to
provide inside information not available to the market. The author explains that debt is
an efficient and believable instrument of firm value, since engaging in new debt
contracts signs the firms’ capability of future coupon debt payments and, on the other
hand, firms with poor performance could not be able of issuing the same levels of debt,
since have higher marginal expected bankruptcy costs than higher quality firms.
2.1.5 Agency Costs Theories
Other contributions to the puzzle defined a firm as nexus of contracts, since everyone
who has an interest in the firms’ activities are part of the whole design web which the
firm is made, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In that web, every role has a different
influence – managers have direct control over the business activity, aside the fact that
shareholders or suppliers of risk capital have indirect control. The foundation of this
definition categorizes debt as less interventionist, because bondholders can only control
the firm in the case of default or covenants breach, and equity as being similar to
hierarchical control, through board of directors and monitoring activities. Considering
this, debt and equity frame can be viewed as a governance structure, as it is suggested
by Williamson (1988). Debt could reduce the agency costs between shareholders and
managers, creating discipline in the use of the available cash-flows. Although an
increase on leverage intensifies the bankruptcy costs. Taking into account this trade-off,
Jensen (1986) defends an optimal debt ratio capable of equalizing the marginal benefits
and costs of debt.
Harris and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990) study the agency costs as determinant of
capital structure, being focused on the conflicts of interest between equityholders and
managers.
The optimal capital structure of Stulz (1990) generate a solution with a debt level
capable of limiting the free cash available, in order to resolve the overinvestment
conflict, as it is presented by Jensen (1986). Additionally, this optimal solution also
incorporates the costs of debt which arise from having the free cash allocated to debt
payments, precluding the execution of profitable investments, thus conducting to
underinvestment. Managers could be reluctant in execute the optimal level of debt on
9account of being a manager’s flexibility restrain mechanism. Therefore, Stulz (1990)
argues that potential takeover targets firms will have more debt, than firms with anti-
takeover measures; he also expects that firms with higher positive net present value
investment opportunities will have less debt in their capital structure, predicting that
value-increasing investments are able of offsetting the value-decreasing ones.
Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that the conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders is regarding liquidation decisions, since it is assumed that managers will
always continue operations even if liquidation is a better scenario for investors. Under
this assumption, debtholders could force liquidation when cash-flows are reduced;
however, default decision study implies investigation costs in order to ultimate the
decision, increasing the resources lost in the liquidation process. As a result, firms with
higher liquidation value, i.e. with more tangible assets and/or lower investigation costs
related to the default process will have higher levels of debt.
In pursuance of the conflicts between debtholders and equityholders, Diamond (1989)
and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) incorporate reputational considerations of firms in
the capital structure decision. The reputation of a firm is dependent on its history of debt
repayment, so firms with a long history have a higher record and therefore will have
more incentives to endorse safer projects. Notwithstanding, young firms do not have
their reputation on stake, having lower costs when balancing riskier projects acceptance.
2.1.6 Market Timing Theory
In more recent years, Market Timing Theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) upgrades the
traditional approaches, being based on the trend of companies issue equity when
market-to-book ratios are high and repurchase when market value is below the book
value. The authors considered this review as having a substantial explanatory power,
using the market-to-book ratios to capture the market timing opportunities perceived by
managers. As a result, the capital structure is a cumulative outcome of attempts to
explore the market opportunities, without having an optimal solution.
Welch (2004) following the approach of Baker and Wurgler (2002) demonstrate that the
debt ratio dynamics is largely explained by stock returns and also stock return-adjusted
historical capital structure. However, it is not due to attempts of exploring market
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timing opportunities, since it has not been found evidence that issuing equity is a used
mechanism of counteract for stock returns variability by corporations. Despite this fact,
the author puts stock return as a first order determinant of debt ratios, being the
correlation between them near one. It also argues that other variables used in the study
of capital structure play a significant role, because are correlated with omitted dynamics
of stock returns.
Elliott, et al. (2008) decomposed the market-to-book ratio into two components –
mispricing and growth options – avoiding the multiple interpretations of this variable. In
a framework with growth options controlled, the author found strong evidence
supporting market timing theory, founding that when equity is overvalued it is probable
that firms issue equity.
2.1.7 Other contributions
Heaton (2002) introduces through the field of behavioural finance the impact of
managers optimism into the problem, without invoking the conflicts of interests stated
above and their agency costs. First, the author supports that optimistic managers could
prefer internal funds, on behalf of external sources, due to the overvaluation made on
the company. Second, since they also overvalue their capabilities, they could pursue
negative net present value projects. These findings implicitly suggest that a certain
amount of free cash-flow, enough to finance the positive net present value projects,
could avoid under-investment. In the optimistic manager scenario, limited available
cash-flows could not work as effective mechanism in order to maximize value creation,
as suggested by Jensen (1986).
Frank and Goyal (2009) developed a research with American companies over 54 years,
from 1950 until 2003, with the goal of identifying reliable patterns of capital structure
explanatory theories, incorporating inputs to capture the main contribution presented in
the literature. The main findings indicate that leverage is positive related with size,
tangible assets and industry leverage; it is also pointed out that it is negatively related
with profits and market-to-book ratios.
11
Summary
Despite all findings, the extensive research pointed out weakness in the main theories of
capital structure. Market Timing approach has low explanatory power in the trends
identified in the leverage ratios; the Pecking Order Theory intuitively relates
profitability with low leverage, however, assets tangibility, industry leverage and firm
size stay out of scope from this theoretical framework; from Trade-off Theory arises the
empirical weakness of profitable firms with lower leverage ratios, although, sustain
size, industry leverage, tangibility and market-to-book as important determinants.
A long journey has been accomplished in direction of the optimal capital structure, but
the puzzle is still unsolved and probably will remain so (Myers, 2001). Granting all this,
new perspectives and determinants are explored, sharping the main building blocks off
this all dynamic process.
In section 2.2, bearing in mind the capital structure theories above mentioned, we shed
further light and discuss the relationship between capital structure and diversification,
introducing a corporate strategy approach to the financial paradigm.
2.2 Capital Structure and Diversification
The limitations of finance paradigm in explaining capital structure decisions at the firm
level suggest that managerial choice is relevant, and the strategy decision framework is
an important complement in capturing the factors that have an impact on this decision
(Barton and Gordon, 1987). In fact this new perspective, complemented with corporate
strategy, is a development from a deterministic product of external market forces as
implied by the finance field, into a more functional managerial decision approach.
In particular, the effect of diversification on capital structure is likely to be a product of
the coinsurance effect (Lewellen, 1971; Kim and McConnell, 1977; Bergh, 1997); the
transaction cost (Williamson, 1988; Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Kochhar and Hitt,
1998) and the agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Kochhar, 1996).
We discussed on the following paragraphs for each of these theories the impact of
Diversification Strategies on Capital Structure.
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2.2.1 Coinsurance Effect
Lewellen (1971) questioned if it was possible to produce gains to the stockholders in a
merger without sufficient operating efficiencies, referring this possibility as a pure
financial combination of enterprises. Following this approach, the author concludes that
mergers provide more debt capacity, because the likelihood of default of the
consolidated firm is smaller than the sum of firm’s individual probability of failure on
debt commitments. The merger partners are now accountable for all the jointed debt
obligations, setting a borrower diversification context, which results in more debt
capacity. Therefore, the coinsurance effect arises from the possibility of imperfect
correlation of cash-flows, which reduces the operational risks, creating additional
borrowing capacity.
In search of coinsurance effect, Kim and McConnell (1977) also conclude that merger
firms employ more debt, than the individual ones. Additionally, it was found that this
increase on leverage didn’t cause abnormal negative returns on bondholders, suggesting
as explanation, that this growth was provided by the occurrence of higher coverage of
the cash-flows.
2.2.2 Transaction Costs
In this framework, firm specific assets1 have lower reutilization in other business and
structures, representing a restricted liquidation value in case of default (Balakrishnan
and Fox, 1993). Subsequently, debt will be preeminent in supporting non-specific assets
acquisitions and, on the other hand, equity will prevail on more focused and specialized
businesses (Williamson, 1988).
Since the diversification type is dependent on the characteristics of the resources
available, as exposed by Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991), unrelated business will point
to more non-specific assets, than related businesses organizations. Therefore, the nature
of assets, measure of their collateral capacity, will dictate the preferred financial tool –
debt or equity.
1 As exposed by Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), this characteristic implies that the utility and output
produce by the asset in a determined firm are higher than an alternative best use in other structure.
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2.2.3 Agency Costs
Jensen (1986) sets the debt as discipline mechanism of managers and controlling device
of free cash-flow available for spending at the discretion of managers. The author also
highlights the role of debt in motivating the organizational efficiency, since the firm
will conduct more efficient procedures and activities, with the threat of fail to comply
with the debt service.
Nonetheless, there are some agency costs along with debt, since managers are agents
acting on the behalf of equity holders and bondholders. Therefore, the debt use
disadvantages comprises the monitoring expenditures, the increase in bankruptcy costs
and also the opportunity wealth loss, to the extent that it influences the investments
decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Shareholders will endorse the use of debt, constraining the opportunistic behaviours and
probably destroying value of diversification strategies held by managers. Therefore,
firms with more leverage will conduct lower unrelated diversification strategies.
In the case of companies with foreign operations, the agency costs of debt intensify,
because geographic dispersion demands more efforts in the information processing,
increasing the costs of monitoring activities. Therefore, bondholders require higher
interest rate to meet with the information asymmetries and higher monitoring costs.
After having discussed the theoretical background regarding Capital Structure and
specifically its relationship with Diversification Strategies, in section 3, we present
some of the empirical studies developed in the field.
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3. Related Research – Capital Structure and Diversification
We complemented the theoretical background presented in the previous section with the
description of some empirical studies developed in the field of Capital Structure and
Diversification Strategies.
Taking into account the aim of the study, the impact of diversification strategies on
leverage, previous empirical evidence is presented and discussed accordingly with the
type of Diversification strategy.
3.1 Leverage and Product Diversification
Barton and Gordon (1987) first empirical study developed over this matter was an
attempt to achieve an integrated view – filling the gap of the financial literature to
explain and understand the capital structure and introduce more functional inputs to the
strategy ground. In the following year, Barton and Gordon (1988) continued the
research, introducing the values and goals of management, based on Andrews (1971)
research, which settle the dimensions of corporate strategy as an organizing framework.
Using a sample of American industrial companies still in existence in 1982, which
maintain the diversification strategy between 1970-74, the study concludes that the level
of debt is different among different strategies of diversification – being unrelated
strategies the ones that achieve a higher volume of debt financing, contrarian to single
or related diversification.
Other important finding was the link between debt and the level of profits – across all
diversification strategies, profit was shown to have a significant negative relationship
with debt. This result is consistent with fact that managers want to have flexibility. So,
with an increase in profit, firms could be financed by internal generated funds, reducing
the level of debt, as it is predicted by Pecking Order Theory discussed in paragraph
2.1.3 (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Kochhar and Hitt (1998) examine the relationship between corporate strategies and
financing types and sources, dividing the diversification strategies into two types –
related and unrelated diversification. A company is pursuing a related diversification
15
when acquires a company which segment is in the same industry or invests in specific
assets related to the company’s industry. Unrelated diversification implies acquisition of
businesses in different industry groups.
Using a sample of 187 large manufacturing firms traded on the American or New York
stock exchange that adopted a diversification strategy during the period of 1982-1986,
the study confirmed that financial decisions are influenced by firm diversification
strategies. The results supported that related diversification implies more specific assets
and businesses, since this is pointed out as more risky from the point of view of fund
suppliers, which may lose their investment if the firm bankrupts. This also, linked with
constraints to managerial actions faced by the debtholders, introduces higher risk into
related diversification strategies. In short, it was found out that equity is preferred for
related diversification and debt for unrelated diversification.
Regarding the source of financing (public or private), the results indicate that it is
influenced by the form of entry in new business – acquiring an existing firm or through
direct entries (internal development). In the case of internal development, since it
involves more uncertainty than acquiring an existing business, because of greater
information asymmetry, firms tend to rely more on private sources. On the other hand,
firms using acquisitions of existing business will use more public sources.
Menendez-Alonso (2003) developed an article to study the effect of diversification on
capital structure in a Spanish panel data composed by 480 manufacturing firms, from
1991 until 1994. The results conclude that diversification does not have influence in the
leverage ratios for Spanish data during the period in study.
3.2 Leverage and Geographic Diversification
Pursuing the relationship of internationalization strategy and capital structure, Singh and
Nejadmalayeri (2004) centred their study in French corporations with best performance
from 1996 until 1999. The authors address some research questions in order to
understand the differences between domestic and multinational firms in respect to the
maturity of debt, the degree of leverage in relation with international diversification and
the impact of international strategies over the cost of capital.
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The models were constructed assuming a non-linear relationship between financial
leverage and internationalization. The rationale behind this assumption is that in the
initial stages of internationalization, firms will need to expand their financial resources,
but will only have available short-term debt, due higher information asymmetries
perceived by investors; then, in a more mature phase of the internationalization strategy,
long-term debt will be available, implying a positive relationship between long-term
debt and the degree of international diversification. The results support the hypothesis
exposed, suggesting a U-shape relationship between the degree of internationalization
and short-term debt; it also was reported that international diversification is positively
related with total and long-term debt.
In respect of cost of capital, the models suggest that more international firms have
higher level of debts, resulting in a reduction of the overall cost of capital. This outcome
is sustained by the effect of debt as hedging instrument of the foreign exchange risk,
particularly higher in international organizations.
3.3 Leverage and Dual Diversification Strategy
Singh, et al. (2003) explore the relationship of two types of diversification – geographic
and product – and their impact on corporate leverage.
According with other authors and respective studies, the two types of diversification
produce different effects on the capital structure. Li and Li (1996) support the fact that
diversified firms need greater leverage, in order to maximize their value. Although, a
considerable number of studies produce evidence showing that domestic firms have
more debt emplaced than multinational companies (Senbet, 1979; Michel and Shaked,
1986; Fatemi, 1988; Lee and Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 1996; Chen, et al., 1997).
Using a sample from 1994 to 1996 of non-financial firms with business segments and
international operations data available, Singh, et al. (2003) achieved a sample of 1,127
American companies.
It was found that product diversity is on average, unconnected with debt, but could be
negatively related in some circumstances. Finally the study also concludes that a dual
strategy diversification – product and also geographic – seems to conduct to higher
leverage, suggesting that coinsurance effect is present.
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3.4 Leverage and New Geographic Area of Operation
In recent years, Joliet and Muller (2013) also study the impacts on capital structure of
international strategies, although assessing the degree of internationalization through the
type of new geographic area of operation reported by the companies. The sample was
categorized by the initial geographic area(s) of operation (domestic firms, firms in
developed countries and well-diversified firms) and the new foreign target area
(developed, emerging and diversified). This cross-sectional analysis improves previous
approaches, since international diversification categorization captures the inherent risks
and opportunities among regions, not being only measured through the foreign to total
sales ratio.
The main stock indexes were used (American S&P 500 and S&P 400, Canadian TSX,
Australian ASX 200, British FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, French SBF 120 and German
DAX 30 and MDAX 50), selecting firms that disclose a new geographic area of
operation between 1994 and 2004 and achieving 246 firms.
The results lead to three main conclusions: i) independently of the initial geographic
diversification of the firm, a new entry in developed countries has no significant impact
in the capital structure; ii) companies well-diversified don’t change their capital
structure significantly after a new foreign area entry and iii) both domestic firms and
firms only active in developed markets significantly increase their debt to equity ratio,
when expanding into a region or country where they had no operation before.
3.5 Summary
Most of the studies found strong evidence regarding the impact of diversification
strategies in capital structure. Those findings are in general supported by the theoretical
field through the Coinsurance Effect (Lewellen, 1971; Kim and McConnell, 1977) and
Agency Costs Theories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Kochhar, 1996).
Table 1 summarizes the samples, variables and main findings of the empirical studies
previously exposed and reviewed.
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Table 1: Summary of empirical studies about Capital Structure and Diversification Strategies reviewed and main findings.
Author(s) of
the study
Sample (Country and Period) Diversification and Control Variables Main Finding
Barton and
Gordon (1988)
Firms selected from 1974 Fortune list of
industrial companies in existence in 1982;
1970 – 1974
Four categories of diversification –single, dominant, related
and unrelated. Control variables – profitability, size, growth
rate, capital intensity and earning risk.
Unrelated firms’ strategies are the ones that achieve a higher
volume of debt financing, contrarian to single or related
diversification.
Kochhar and
Hitt (1998)
Large manufacturing firms traded on the
American or New York stock exchange
that adopted a diversification strategy
during the period of 1982-86
Entropy measure of total product diversification see Appendix
1; control variables – size, bankruptcy risk, firm risk and
proportion of new debt financing.
Equity financing is linked with related diversification and
unrelated diversification with debt. Diversification through
acquisitions seems to be supported by debt and internal
development of new business by equity.
Menendez-
Alonso (2003)
Spanish manufacturing firms; 1991 – 1994
Diversification index of sales segments; Control variables -
business risk, growth, size, R&D investment and profitability
Diversification appears with not significant explanatory power
of leverage ratios.
Singh, et al.
(2003)
Non-financial firms listed U.S. firms with
annual sales higher than US$ 10 million
and business segments and international
operations data available; 1994 – 1996
Entropy measure of total product diversification, see Appendix
1 and ratio of foreign sales to domestic sales as geographic
diversification proxy. Control variables – profitability, growth
opportunities, size and managerial efficiency.
A dual diversification strategy – product as well international
– show more debt usage, suggesting that coinsurance effect of
diversification occurs. However, product diversification may
be negatively related to firm leverage.
Singh and
Nejadmalayeri
(2004)
French firms in the best performing list for
four consecutive years; 1996 – 1999
Ratio of foreign to total assets; ratio of foreign to total sales
and ratio of foreign to total income; Control variables – size,
growth, profitability and market performance.
Non-linear inverted U-shape relationship between the degree
of international diversification and short-term debt financing;
international diversified firms support higher level of debt
financing.
Joliet and
Muller (2013)
Non- financial firms included in American,
Canadian, Australian, British, French and
German main stock indexes; 1991 – 2007
Companies classified according their international
diversification strategies – developed, emerging and
diversified; Control variables – marginal tax rate, bankruptcy
costs, profitability, assets collateral value, growth and
corporate investments.
Both domestic firms and firms only active in developed
markets significantly increase their debt to equity ratio when
expanding into a region or country where they had no
operation before.
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The previous studies have focused on samples from America and some European
countries, namely French and Spain. However, the impact of Diversification Strategies
on Leverage has not, so far, being studied for Portugal. Our study aims to contribute to
fill the gap in the literature with an empirical research to study the effect of
Diversification Strategies on Capital Structure of listed Portuguese companies.
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4. Hypotheses Development and Research Design
This section presents the research questions and the methodology adopted in our study,
being firstly developed the hypotheses and then the empirical models along with
variables construction.
4.1 Research Hypotheses
As discussed in the previous section, the literature highlights the fact there is not a
unique and single perspective capable of incorporate all the important determinants in
the capital structure dynamic process. In fact, several elements have to be considered to
construct a useful and effective explanatory model – the tax benefits and the financial
distress costs of debt; the agency costs of debt and equity and the signalling effect of
debt. Those elements capture the essence of the main building blocks of capital
structure theory – the traditional Trade-off and Pecking Order theories, the agency cost
and imperfect information approach and the signalling models.
Bearing in mind the aim of this study, the usefulness of diversification in explaining the
capital structure for listed Portuguese companies, we introduce this managerial input as
a strategic viewpoint in the study of capital structure.
Leverage and Product Diversification
In light of Coinsurance Effect, firms with uncorrelated cash-flows from different
businesses and segments will have more debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971). Singh, et al.
(2003) also found evidence of the Coinsurance Effect of diversification in the debt
usage. Other studies report higher Leverage for unrelated diversification (Barton and
Gordon, 1988; Kochhar and Hitt, 1998). Therefore, it is expected a positive relationship
between Leverage and the degree of the Product Diversification. Based on these
arguments, we formulated the following hypothesis:
H1: Leverage is positively related with Product Diversification
Leverage and Geographic Diversification
Taking into account agency costs theory perspective of Jensen and Meckling (1976),
firms with more disperse activities increase the agency costs of debt, such as
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information asymmetries between bondholders and shareholders and costs of
monitoring their performance. Accordingly, geographic diversification implies higher
agency costs of debt, reducing the debt usage, as it was found out by Singh, et al.
(2003). Other authors also found evidence that domestic firms have more debt than
multinational ones (Senbet, 1979; Michel and Shaked, 1986; Fatemi, 1988; Lee and
Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 1996; Chen, et al., 1997). As a result, Leverage is related with
Geographic Diversification.
Furthermore, Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) argue that, in the initial stages of
international diversification, firms will demand debt to face their financial needs, since
other sources will only be available in a more mature phase of the international strategy,
when the information asymmetries perceived by investors reduce. So, it is expected a
non-linear, specifically inverted U-shape, relationship between Leverage and the degree
of Geographic Diversification. Based on these arguments, we formulated the following
hypothesis:
H2: Leverage has an inverted U-shape relationship with Geographic Diversification
4.2 Empirical Models
Likewise other studies that adopted a similar approach (Barton and Gordon, 1988;
Kochhar and Hitt, 1998; Menendez-Alonso, 2003; Singh, et al., 2003; Singh and
Nejadmalayeri, 2004; Frank and Goyal, 2009) this study of the capital structure
determinants will apply a regression analysis.
To test the hypotheses developed in the previous section, we use a multiple linear
regression model which settles relationship between Leverage, the dependent variable,
and the explanatory or independent variables.
4.2.1 Panel Data Models
Regression analyses might be based on time series, sectional or panel data. The first
ones are related with observations of a variable in different time periods; sectional data,
it deals with data obtained in the same point of the time period; as respects to panel
data, it is composed by multi-dimensional observations obtained over several time
periods (Wooldridge, 2008).
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The panel data assembles several advantages over sectional or time-series data, such as
the possibility of gathering more information, larger samples and more accurate
statistical inference in hypotheses testing, because it generally contains more degrees of
freedom and sample variability (Hsiao, 2006). Based on the above, we used a panel data
model in the current study as exposed in the section 4.2.2.
In furtherance of panel data estimations, the most common approaches are the Pooled
Regression (OLS - Ordinary Least Squares) or static panel data model admitting the
existence of unobservable individual effects random or fixed. The OLS method is
suggested as the most simple, although each observation is considered as an
independent unit, in spite of the transversal and temporal dimension of panel data.
As regards to the Fixed Effect Model, it admits that the unobservable individual effects
are constant and correlated with the independent variables. Similarly, the model
assumes that the differences in the company’s specificities and overtime can be
captured through a constant term (Johnston, 2001).
By contrast, the Random Effect Model the unobservable individual effect is not
correlated with the independent variables. Therefore, in this specification the
differences in the company’s specificities and overtime are unknown, unobservable and
not measured (Marques, 2000).
The main challenge in panel data estimations is to adopt the appropriate methodology,
able of controlling the impact of the unobserved heterogeneity (Hsiao, 2006).
In order to choose between fixed or random effects, Mátyás and Sevestre (2008)
identified two main questions – i) the study purpose and ii) the context and sample
selection and its environment. Marques (2000) exposes that if the study is designed to
statistically infer about a particular individual unit (e.g. a specific group of countries)
the fixed effects estimator will be more consistent and efficient.
On that account, we applied the Hausman Test1 to select which is the appropriate
estimator for the sample in study, i.e. select the fixed effect which admits the existence
of correlation between the unobservable individual effects and the explanatory variables
or adopt a random effect estimator which recognizes no correlation between them.
1 Hausman Test details are exposed in Appendix 2.
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4.2.2 The Model
To test our hypotheses H1 and H2 we estimate the following regression model, presented
in equation (4.1), representative of the basic panel data model, as previously discussed.
In order to isolate other influences on the firms’ capital structure, control variables will
be used, following the inputs provided by Pecking Order theory and Trade-off theory
and the similar studies reviewed in the previous section (Barton and Gordon, 1988;
Kochhar and Hitt, 1998; Menendez-Alonso, 2003; Singh, et al., 2003; Singh and
Nejadmalayeri, 2004; Frank and Goyal, 2009).
The model to be estimated is:
ࡸࡱࢂ࢏࢚= ઺૙ + ઺૚ ∗ ۾܀۽۲۲۷܄࢏࢚+ ઺૛ ∗ ۵۳۽۲۷܄࢏࢚+ ઺૜ ∗ ܁܀۵۳۽۲۷܄࢏࢚+ ઺૝ ∗ ۾܀۽۴࢏࢚+ ઺૞
∗ ܂ۯۼ۵࢏࢚+ ઺૟ ∗ ܁۷܈۳࢏࢚+ ઺ૠ ∗ ۵܀۽܅ ܂۶࢏࢚+ ઺ૡ ∗ ۳۴۴۷۱۷۳ۼ۱܇࢏࢚+ ࢿ࢏࢚ (4.1)
Wherein:
- LEVit denotes Leverage for the company i in the year t. The choice of the Leverage
indicator is crucial for the research design, since different measures of Leverage
could lead to different results. As argued by Rajan and Zingales (1995) study of
Leverage for international panels, the ranking of most leveraged countries changes
across measures. So, empirical studies have not unequivocally concluded that one of
the measures is more useful. Those authors also argue that when the purpose is to
study the effect of financing decisions, the ratio of total debt to capital (debt plus
equity) will be the most adequate variable. On the other hand, those authors also
pointed out that ratios using total assets as deflator could fail, because some assets
are used to offset non-debt liabilities, such as trade receivables. Considering that,
debt ratios calculated using total assets are influenced by industrial specifications
which affect the level of trade receivables, as well as accounts payable. Therefore,
ratios unaffected by the gross level of trade credit or other changes in assets not
related to financing decisions are a preferred measure. Consequently, we measure the
firm’s leverage through three debt ratios – total debt, long-term debt and short-term
debt ratios – computed using each level of debt deflated by the sum of book value of
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debt2 and the market value of equity, expressed by the market capitalization at year
end. As a result, we have three variants of the regression (4.1) for each measure of
Leverage.
- PRODDIVit is the Product Diversification for the company i in the year t, measured
through the segment report of sales disclosed in the annual financial statements of the
companies, applying the Entropy Measure of Diversification, as showed in Appendix
1 (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). This measure was also used by Kochhar and Hitt
(1998) and Singh, et al. (2003). Firms focused in a single segment will have
diversification indexes with zero value; as long as the diversification increases, i.e.,
the dispersion of sales among relevant segments is higher, the entropy measure will
raise. As exposed in H1, it is expected a positive relationship between Leverage and
Product Diversification, and as such its coefficient to be positive.
- GEODIVit is the Geographic Diversification for the company i in the year t; being
measured also applying Entropy Measure of Diversification, as per variable
PRODDIVit and with the same behaviour, but using Geographic segment report of
sales. We do not predict any signal for this coefficient as it has been incorporated to
study non-linearities between Leverage and Geographic Diversification.
Consequentially, this variable should be analysed together with the variable
SRGEODIVit, presented below.
- SRGEODIVit is the square ratio of GEODIVit, measured by the square ratio of
geographic entropy measure, adopting a similar approach to the one used in Singh
and Nejadmalayeri (2004). This variable is introduced to study possible non-linear
relationships between Leverage and Geographic Diversification. As such, recalling
H2, an inverted U-shape relationship between Leverage and Geographic
Diversification, it is expected its coefficient to be negative.
Control Variables
- PROFit is the Profitability for the company i in the year t. In this study, we used the
proxy Return on Assets (Earnings before interest and taxes/ Total Assets), since it is
2 The market value of debt would be a more accurate measure. However, to achieve it, maturity dates and
interest rates will be needed, implying a smaller sample to have that information available. Additionally,
Bowman (1980) and Titman and Wessels (1988) found evidence of a large cross-sectional correlation
between market value of debt and its book value.
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considered an efficient variable, on account of being correlated with additional return
measures (Bettis, 1981). Myers and Majluf (1984) defend that firms prefer internal
funds, rather than external financing, leaving the choice of the Leverage level
dependent on the investment opportunities and the cash flow available. In this way,
more profitable firms will have more retained earnings (ceteris paribus) to finance
their growth, having lower Leverage. Adversely, analysing the trade-off between tax
advantage of debt and the Leverage related costs, other authors, Kraus and
Litzenberger (1973), Bradley, et al. (1984) and Hillier, et al. (2011), proposed a
contrary expected relationship between profitability and debt. According to Trade-off
theory, discussed in the section 2.1.2, firms with better performance will attempt to
reduce the taxes from its positive earnings, using deductible interest expenses.
Finally, the signalling effect of debt, previously exposed in the section 2.1.4, also
contributes to a positive expected relationship between Profitability and Leverage,
because issuance of debt signs the capability of the firm comply with future debt
payments, being an efficient way to adjust the information asymmetries between
stakeholders over firm’s performance. Despite the contradiction in the literature, we
expected a negative relationship between Profitability and Leverage, following the
findings present in the previous studies - Barton and Gordon (1988), Singh, et al.
(2003), Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004), Joliet and Muller (2013) and Frank and
Goyal (2009).
- TANGit is the Asset Tangibility for the company i in the year t, incorporating the
value of assets in place that might be used as debt collateral, measured through the
ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment to Total Assets, also used, among others, in
Frank and Goyal (2009). The Asset Tangibility captures the possible debt collaterals
and consequently the value liquidation of firm in case of bankruptcy. As a result, it is
expected that the possession of relative high tangible assets will improve debt
capacity, since debtholders will perceived a lower risk, reducing the agency costs of
debt. Therefore, we incorporated Assets Tangibility to analyse this positive expected
relationship, as in similar studies (Myers, 1984; Barton and Gordon, 1988; Singh, et
al., 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2009) and expect its coefficient to be positive.
- SIZEit is the Firm Size for the company i in the year t. Following similar studies
(Singh, et al., 2003; Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004; Frank and Goyal, 2009) we use
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for the size variable the logarithm of assets. Also in which concerns this variable,
Pecking Order theory and Trade-off theory have opposite perspectives in respect to
Firm Size. Based on Pecking Order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), exposed in
section 2.1.3, as well as Titman and Wessels (1988) is expected a negative
relationship, since smaller firms have higher costs in equity issues than larger ones
and are consequently predisposed to use more debt. Contrarily, from Trade-off
theory, it is expected a positive relationship, because firms with more robust
structure will be able to reduce the transaction and agency costs, being able to trade
larger blocks of debt. We expect a positive relationship between Leverage and Firm
Size, as reported by Singh, et al. (2003), Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) and Frank
and Goyal (2009).
- GROWTHit represents the Growth Opportunities for the company i in the year t. As
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Singh, et al. (2003), Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) and
Joliet and Muller (2013), we use Market-to-book Ratio as a proxy for growth
opportunities, being determined through the ratio of the Enterprise Value3 to Total
Assets. As it was pointed out by Myers (1977), growth opportunities could be
postponed or eventually wasted, when firms have their cash-flows restricted to
ensure debt commitments. Based on that, we expect a negative signal for the
coefficient of Growth Opportunities.
- EFFICIENCYit is the Managerial Efficiency for the company i in the year t. We use
the amount of revenues generated for each euro of assets as a proxy of the
Managerial Efficiency, that is Asset Turnover ratio (Sales to total Assets), consistent
with Singh, et al. (2003). Firms less efficient than others will require more
management restraint devices. Knowing that debt is as disciplinary mechanism of
managers and controlling device of free cash-flow, it is expected a negative
relationship between Leverage and Managerial Efficiency, as it was reported by
Singh, et al. (2003).
- β0, β1, β2, …., βk are the Regression Coefficients;
3 Enterprise Value is computed through the Fiscal Period End Market Capitalisation, plus Preferred Stock,
plus Minority Interest, plus Total Debt, minus Cash.
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- εit is the estimation error which complies with the classical assumptions of models
estimated by OLS technique.
Table 2 summarizes the dependent variables, explanatory and control variables,
hypotheses, variable proxies used in this study and its expected signal on leverage.
Table 2: Summary of the dependent and independent variables and expected relationship with
Leverage.
Hypotheses/ Variables Proxy Variable ShortRepresentation
Expected
Signal
Dependent Variables (LEV)
Total Debt Ratio Total Debt / (Total Debt + MarketCapitalization) TDR
Long-term Debt Ratio Long-term Debt Ratio / (TotalDebt + Market Capitalization) LTDR
Short-term Debt Ratio Short-term Debt Ratio / (TotalDebt + Market Capitalization) STDR
Hypotheses and Explanatory Variables
H1 Product Diversification
Entropy measure using
operational sales segments PRODDIV +
H2
Geographic
Diversification
Entropy measure using
geographic sales segments GEODIV ?
Square Ratio of GEODIV SRGEODIV -
Control Variables
Profitability Earnings before interest andtaxes/ Total Assets PROF -
Asset Tangibility Net Property, Plant andEquipment / Total Assets TANG +
Firm Size Logarithm of Total Assets SIZE +
Growth opportunities Enterprise Value / Total Assets GROWTH -
Managerial Efficiency Sales / Total Assets EFFICIENCY -
Note: As referred in the definition of LEVit variable, firms Leverage was measured through the three debt ratios
summarized in this table.
We present in this section the research hypotheses and the models for testing them. In
next section, we present the sample and data collection, as well as its descriptive
statistics.
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5. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our research analyses the impact of Diversification on Leverage. We have focused the
selection of our sample on Portuguese companies listed on Euronext Lisbon. The reason
for this choice comes from the fact that, as far we know, no previous research in the
field of Leverage and Diversification has been carried out using Portuguese data.
Section 5.1 presents the sample selection and data collection. Descriptive statistics of
the sample used in this study are displayed and discussed in section 5.2.
5.1 Sample Selection and Data
The data of the annual reports and disclosures of segment information were collected
from DataStream database of Thomson Reuters for listed Portuguese companies on
Euronext Lisbon in 2015.
Financial companies were excluded, since they have specific regulations applied to their
capital structure as well as companies with year-end different from 31st of December,
constructing a panel data with annual frequency from January until December of each
year.
Our sample period extends from 2003 to 2013, since we considered relevant to include
the most recent data available, thus, the sample is composed by observations until 2013;
on the other hand, as a result of the current financial crisis, beginning in 2008 (Grouhy,
et al., 2008), the time period window was expanded incorporating five years before, in
order to capture a pre-crisis period.
The final sample was computed eliminating observations with no data available for the
variables in study, achieving a final sample of 35 companies4, representing 203
company-year combinations.
4 The companies are presented in Annex 1.
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics
5.2.1 Global Characterization of the sample
Table 3 reports the number of firms in sample by industry in accordance with two-digits
SIC Code5.
Table 3: Sample distribution across industries.
Industry Companies Obs. % Obs.
Business Services 3 23 11%
Communications 4 22 11%
Food Stores 2 20 10%
Heavy Construction, Except Building Construction - Contractors 4 19 9%
Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 2 18 9%
Paper and Allied Products 3 17 8%
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 2 16 8%
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 2 14 7%
Eating and Drinking Places 1 9 4%
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 1 9 4%
Amusement and Recreation Services 1 6 3%
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 1 6 3%
Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 2 6 3%
Transportation Equipment 1 6 3%
Food and Kindred Products 2 5 2%
Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 1 4 2%
Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 1 1 0%
Primary Metal Industries 1 1 0%
Real Estate 1 1 0%
Total 35 203 100%
Note: Industries correspond to the Two-digit SIC Code.
Table 3 shows that the observations are distributed along several sectors, being the ones
with more percentage Business Services and Communications with 11% of the total
panel each one. Consequently, no influence is expected from the industry.
The sample was broadly divided into two groups as presented in Table 4, taking into
account the two types of diversification strategy – product and geographic – using the
segment report of sales and computing the Entropy Measure of Diversification for each
type, applying the formula on the Appendix 1.
Table 4 reveals that most of the current listed Portuguese companies are in average
focused in a single segment for both Product and Geographic strategies. Regarding
5 Standard Industrial Classification code is a four-digit numerical code assigned by the United States
Government to identify the primary business of a company. The first two digits identify the major
Industry Group.
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Geographic Diversification, the number of companies highly diversified is higher than
within Product Diversification group.
Table 4: Breakdown of the sample within each type of diversification, using Entropy Measure of
Diversification Index.
Year Product Diversification Total Geographic Diversification Total
Focused Medium High Focused Medium High
2003 12 5 1 18 13 2 3 18
2004 15 4 19 13 2 4 19
2005 15 3 18 14 1 3 18
2006 14 2 16 13 1 2 16
2007 17 1 1 19 16 2 1 19
2008 16 3 1 20 19 1 20
2009 12 6 1 19 14 3 2 19
2010 12 6 2 20 15 4 1 20
2011 16 6 2 24 16 6 2 24
2012 10 4 14 8 5 1 14
2013 13 3 16 10 4 2 16
Total 152 43 8 203 151 31 21 203
Notes:
If the Entropy Measure of Diversification index is 0, the company is focused in a single segment,
having no diversification, referred to as “focused”; indexes between 1 and 1.5 represent firms with
medium diversification (“medium” column); being high diversification showed by ratios higher than
1.5 (“high” column).
Graph 1 presents the evolution of the debt ratios, different proxies for our dependent
research variables, for the sample in the study.
Graph 1: Sample Average Leverage evolution between 2003 and 2013.
On average, companies have more than 50% of the capital structure composed by debt,
except in the years from 2004 until 2007.
Graph 2 displays the average composition of the capital structure of the sample.
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Graph 2: Average composition of Sample Capital Structure between 2003 and 2013.
From 2003 until 2007, on average the equity slice of the capital structure increased. In
the period of the 2008 financial crisis, from 2008 until the present, the equity financing
was replaced by long-term debt. As respect of short-term debt, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2011
and 2013 were the years with higher significance; although, it remains more or less
constant over the period under review.
Graph 3 presents the evolution of the Debt to Gross Operating Surplus Ratio for the
period under review for Non-Financial companies in several European countries and
United States of America.
Graph 3: Non-financial corporations’ debt to gross operating surplus ratio, between 2003 and 2013.
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Debt is the sum of securities other than shares, except financial derivatives, loans and other accounts
payables. Gross operating surplus is the measure of Earnings before interest and depreciation and
amortizations and taxes. A ratio of 2.5 means that debt outstanding is 2.5 times larger than the gross
operating surplus (OECD, 2015).
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Graph 3 reveals that the evolution of leverage in the sample is consistent with the
evolution of Debt to Gross Operating Surplus Ratio, for Portuguese non-financial
companies during the period in analysis.
Comparing to countries from the empirical studies developed in the field (Barton and
Gordon, 1988; Kochhar and Hitt, 1998; Menendez-Alonso, 2003; Singh, et al., 2003;
Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004; Joliet and Muller, 2013) Portuguese companies are
consistently more levered than the ones from United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany
and United States of America.
In matter of leverage of listed Portuguese companies, the International Monetary Fund
reports its excess in the Global Financial Stability Report of 2013 (IMF, 2013). The
document also contains vulnerability indicators for listed companies to measure
Profitability and Interest Coverage Ratio. It was reported that 32% of the Portuguese
listed companies in 2011 had their Interest Coverage Ratios below 1; regarding
profitability, the results were similar to listed companies of Spain and Italy, but below
the average of German, France and Ireland (IMF, 2013).
Based on the above referred, we inferred that leverage in our sample is consistent with
statistics from Portugal and also with IMF (2013) conclusions for listed Portuguese
companies. As such, we considered our sample representative of the listed Portuguese
companies’ scenario.
5.2.2 Other Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 exhibits some of descriptive statistics – mean, median, maximum, minimum
and standard deviation of the research variables.
The sample was divided into two panels for each type of diversification (product and
geographic), according to the breakdown based on the Entropy Measure of
Diversification: low for diversification focused in a single segment (Panel B and D) and
high is a cumulative representation of the parameters medium and high referred in Table
4 (Panel A and C).
Regarding Panel A and B, firms with high Product Diversification feature 0.55 average
Leverage, against 0.52 for low Product diversified firms. Singh, et al. (2003) reported
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similar results, being product diversified firms the ones with higher means for the
Leverage indicators.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample.
LEV PRODDIV
GEO
DIV PROF TANG SIZE GROWTH EFFICIENCY
Panel A – High Product Diversification
Mean 0.55 1.23 0.73 0.03 0.33 5.94 0.81 0.76
Median 0.60 1.12 0.70 0.04 0.36 5.57 0.73 0.68
Maximum 0.94 1.87 1.88 0.22 0.61 7.63 1.39 2.24
Minimum 0.02 1.00 0.00 -0.20 0.01 4.25 0.33 0.31
Std. Dev. 0.26 0.23 0.52 0.07 0.17 0.96 0.24 0.41
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Panel B - Low Product Diversification
Mean 0.52 0.44 0.71 0.05 0.37 6.01 0.90 0.81
Median 0.52 0.50 0.59 0.06 0.37 6.06 0.81 0.65
Maximum 0.98 0.99 2.19 0.19 0.81 7.49 3.42 2.40
Minimum 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.27 0.00 3.80 0.23 0.01
Std. Dev. 0.23 0.32 0.60 0.06 0.20 0.68 0.45 0.51
N 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Panel C - High Geographic Diversification
Mean 0.59 0.67 1.53 0.04 0.43 6.30 0.77 0.61
Median 0.58 0.61 1.41 0.05 0.43 6.34 0.70 0.50
Maximum 0.98 1.87 2.19 0.11 0.73 7.63 1.39 1.02
Minimum 0.29 0.00 1.00 -0.20 0.14 4.97 0.38 0.31
Std. Dev. 0.18 0.60 0.36 0.05 0.16 0.67 0.25 0.21
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Panel D- Low Geographic Diversification
Mean 0.51 0.63 0.43 0.04 0.34 5.89 0.91 0.87
Median 0.54 0.65 0.45 0.05 0.36 5.88 0.82 0.73
Maximum 0.97 1.66 0.97 0.22 0.81 7.55 3.42 2.40
Minimum 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.27 0.00 3.80 0.23 0.01
Std. Dev. 0.25 0.39 0.31 0.07 0.20 0.76 0.44 0.53
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151
Notes:
Panel A represents product diversified firms with Product Diversification Index above 1;
Panel B is composed by the companies with Product Diversification Index below 1, being focused in one segment;
Panel C belong to high geographic diversification companies, with Geographic Diversification Index above 1;
Panel D corresponds to firms’ sales focused only in one country, having Geographic Diversification Indexes below 1.
LEV represents the dependent variable Leverage, measured through the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt
plus market capitalization.
Independent Variables – PRODDIV: Product Diversification; GEODIV: Geographic Diversification; PROF:
Profitability; TANG: Tangibility; GROWTH: Growth opportunities; EFFICIENCY: Managerial Efficiency.
N – Observations.
Firms with higher Geographic Diversification have, on average, higher Leverage, being
opposite results found in Singh, et al. (2003) and Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004).
Those authors reported that on average domestic firms have more Leverage.
As noted in Table 5, the maximum level of Leverage is displayed in Panel B and C,
corresponding to Firms with low Product Diversification or with high Geographic
Diversification.
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Profitability displays similar results for each panel – on average firms have positive
levels of Profitability, although, the lag between the minimum and maximum and also
the standard deviation value (above the mean) indicate a great level of dispersion.
Considering the potential existence of outliers, this will be treated in robustness tests of
the model.
On average, the four panels, A, B, C and D reveal similar Asset Tangibility values,
being also accentuated the lag between the maximum and minimum for this variable,
since some firms present no Asset Tangibility at all (zero value), meaning residual
values of Property, Plant and Equipment in its Assets, against firms with Property Plant
and Equipment representing 81% of the total Assets.
Regarding Firm Size, considering that all the firms in the sample are listed companies,
the values of standard deviation are small comparing with the means, showing low
dispersion of values.
Growth Opportunities, measured through Market-to-book Ratio, are on average superior
for focused firms, whereas the high values belong to Panel B and D, belonging to firms
with low diversification.
On the subject of Managerial Efficiency, more diversified firms are on average the ones
with higher values of Asset Turnover ratios.
In short, at this stage, it appears that firms with more international activities have more
Leverage, on average. Regarding Product Diversification, firms more focused have, on
average, lower levels of Leverage.
Having presented the procedures of the sample for testing the hypotheses formulated in
section 4 and data collection, we discussed in section 6 the empirical results.
35
6. Empirical Results
The first section will start with a univariate analysis of the relationship between
Leverage, as dependent variable, and the explanatory variables presented in the section
4.
Finally, the empirical results obtained from the regression analysis to test the formulated
hypotheses will be presented and discussed in section 6.2. Throughout the analysis, the
models have been regressed by OLS (Ordinary Least Squares).
6.1 Univariate Results
The purpose of the univariate analysis is to investigate separately the relationship
between the dependent variable and each independent variable. This exercise is also
useful to select which variables should be incorporated in the regression models.
However, we built the model and the explanatory variables to test the hypotheses
formulated in the section 4 and several control variables based on the literature review.
Table 6 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among our research variables,
including only the Total Debt Ratio as dependent variable. The correlation matrixes
using instead of Total Debt, Long-term Debt and Short-term Debt Ratios which
evidence similar results, are tabulated in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 of this study.
Table 6: Pearson Correlation Matrix, using Total Debt Ratio as Leverage measure.
LEV PRODDIV
GEO
DIV PROF TANG SIZE GROWTH EFFICIENCY
DEBT RATIO 1.00
PRODDIV 0.02 1.00
GEODIV 0.10 -0.07 1.00
PROF -0.41*** -0.10 0.03 1.00
TANG 0.04 -0.23*** 0.31*** 0.23*** 1.00
SIZE 0.10 0.12* 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 1.00
GROWTH -0.57*** -0.07 -0.12* 0.10 0.10 -0.05 1.00
EFFICIENCY -0.48*** -0.22*** -0.10 0.30*** 0.04 -0.13* 0.38*** 1.00
Notes:
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. LEV represents the dependent variable
Leverage, measured through the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt plus market capitalization. Independent
Variables – PRODDIV: Product Diversification; GEODIV: Geographic Diversification; PROF: Profitability;
TANG: Asset Tangibility; GROWTH: Growth opportunities; EFFICIENCY: Managerial Efficiency.
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Regarding the correlation with Leverage, only Profitability, Growth Opportunities and
Managerial Efficiency have a statistical significance relationship with Leverage, being
negative as expected.
Using the Long-term Debt Ratio as dependent variable, the results are similar to the
ones previous exposed, being Firm Size, additionally, as expected, positive correlated.
Short-term Debt Ratio appears negatively correlated with Profitability, Firm Size and
Growth Opportunities, also as expected.
The magnitude of the correlation among the independent variables is relatively low,
being all the coefficients below 0.5, suggesting no significant multicollinearity between
these variables, which should be taken into account in the regressions analysis.
It should however be noted that Asset Tangibility exhibits coefficients statistically
significant with Product Diversification, Geographic Diversification, Profitability and
Firm Size in the Total Debt Ratio, Long-term Debt Ratio and Short-term Debt Ratio
correlation matrixes. This result highlights the link between resources and the type of
firm’s diversification (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991), since the company’s strategy
dictates the type of assets.
The results in Table 6 also show a statistical significant relationship between Firm Size
and Geographic Diversification, Profitability, Asset Tangibility, Product Diversification
and Managerial Efficiency for the three correlation matrixes. In fact, Firm Size captures
several companies’ characteristics. It is usually the correlation of Firm Size with the
remaining independent variables, as it was reported for example in Singh, et al. (2003).
6.2 Multivariate Results
Following the details of the sample characterization described in section 5, we
incorporated in the equation (4.1) a dummy variable to control the period of the 2008
Financial Crisis. Recalling, the leverage of the sample changes its descending evolution
in the beginning of the 2008, becoming relevant incorporate this qualitative variable.
Firstly, we will discuss our findings from the regression of the model (4.1) in section
6.2.1. Then, in section 6.2.2, we will analyse in more detail the impact of 2008
Financial Crisis on Leverage.
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6.2.1 General Empirical Results
During the year of 2005, within our sample time period, a mandatory transition from
local account rules (Local GAAP) to International Accounting Standards/International
Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) occurred for public European companies,
which may have impact on our findings. This transition, with the aim to increase the
quality and consistency of reporting standards, has led to major changes in several
reported disclosures and financial indicators (Vazakides, et al., 2013). In particular, the
reported total assets had significant changes, due to revisions on goodwill, intangible
assets, property, plant and equipment, investment property and deferred tax assets
(Costa and Lopes, 2010; Vazakides, et al., 2013). Regarding liabilities, the major
changes impacted the reported provisions and deferred tax liabilities (Costa and Lopes,
2010; Vazakides, et al., 2013). It was also reported significant changes in ratios, like
Return on Assets (Earnings before Interest and Taxes to Total Assets) and Return on
Equity (Net Income to Total Equity) (Costa and Lopes, 2010; Vazakides, et al., 2013).
Considering the significant changes with IAS/IFRS transition, most of the control
variables of our study could be affected, because Total Assets is a deflator used in
Profitability, Asset Tangibility, Growth opportunities and Managerial Efficiency, and it
is the measure of Firm Size. Additionally, Property, Plant and Equipment and Return on
Assets were also influenced with changes in the accounting standards, affecting Asset
Tangibility and Profitability, respectively.
Regarding our explanatory variables (Product and Geographic Diversification), the
segment report of sales was also required in the Portuguese GAAP, so those variables
were not affected with the IAS/IFRS transition.
Wherefore, we control any the effect of the IAS/IFRS transition, by regression our
sample for the period 2005 – 2013, where all listed firms applied the international
standard and concluded about the differences between the whole period 2003 – 2013
and 2005 – 2013.
Table 7 shows the results of the regression models (4.1), using sample pooled over
years and firms, for each dependent variable, Total Debt Ratio, Long-term Debt Ratio
and Short-term Debt Ratio. The Appendix 5 reports the results of the regressions
models (4.1) for the sample from 2005 until 2013.
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Table 7: Regression Results of the Model (4.1) for the total sample, for the period 2003 - 2013.
The table reports results of regressions regarding the three debt ratios – total debt to the sum of total debt
and market capitalization ratio; long-term debt to the sum of total debt and market capitalization ratio and
short-term debt to the sum of total debt and market capitalization ratio - using the explanatory variables
presented in the section 4.
Independent Variables Expected Signal
Leverage (Dependent Variables)
TDR LTDR STDR
Explanatory Variables
PRODDIV + 0.00 -0.05* 0.03(0) (-1.87) (1.45)
GEODIV ? 0.14* 0.03 0.10(1.95) (0.44) (1.15)
SRGEODIV - -0.09** 0.00 -0.08*(-2.59) (-0.11) (-1.92)
Control Variables
PROF - -0.91*** -0.21 -0.76***(-5.55) (-1.31) (-5.12)
TANG + 0.05 -0.17** 0.23***(0) (-2.35) (5.26)
SIZE + 0.03 0.08*** -0.06***(1) (3.12) (-3.1)
GROWTH - -0.24*** -0.09*** -0.15***(-9.21) (-3.59) (-3.51)
EFFICIENCY - -0.13*** -0.15*** 0.02(-3.13) (-4.18) (0.91)
DFC2008 ?
0.05** 0.04*** 0.01
(2.78) (2.27) (0.65)
R2 57% 36% 32%
Adjusted R2 55% 33% 29%
F-statistic 2.80 11.97 10.02
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 203
Periods 2003 - 2013
Method Random Effect
Notes:
T-statistics are given bellow the coefficients estimates in parenthesis. ***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The Hausman Test, reported in Appendix 2, was performed, being the null hypothesis not rejected for all
three models, i.e., the random effect estimator is more adequate than the fixed effect.
Dependent Variables - TDR: Total Debt Ratio; LTDR: Long-term Debt Ratio; STDR: Short-term Debt
Ratio.
Independent Variables – PRODDIV: Product Diversification; GEODIV: Geographic Diversification;
SRGEODIV: Square Ratio of Geographic Diversification; PROF: Profitability; TANG: Asset Tangibility;
GROWTH: Growth opportunities; EFFICIENCY: Managerial Efficiency; DFC2008: dummy variable
which assumes 1 if 2008 financial crisis is present, i.e. if the years are from 2008 until 2013 and 0
otherwise.
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Our aim is to test the relationship between Leverage and Product and Geographic
Diversification, being the main parameters of interest to test the hypotheses the
coefficients of PRODDIV and SRGEODIV.
In a first stage, it will be assessed if the fitted model to the data is statistical significant,
performing the following overall test of significance:
H0: β1 = β2 = . . . βk = 0
H1: at least one βj ≠ 0. 
Thereafter, the hypotheses test will be performed to report the empirical evidence
obtain, complementing with a balance between the results accomplished and the
hypotheses designed.
From an overall test of significance perspective, as disclosed in Table 7, p-value is
equal to 0.000 for the three regressions; so, the null hypothesis is rejected. Accordingly,
the model as a whole explains the Leverage variables.
Analysing the R2, a comparative measure of the explanatory power of the regressions
models, all the three models have this indicator above 30%, being similar levels
obtained in previous studies (Singh, et al., 2003; Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004; Frank
and Goyal, 2009).
Empirical Results
The positive expected relationship between Leverage and Product Diversification,
defined in H1, was not confirmed for the three Leverage regressions. In fact, Product
Diversification presents a negative relationship with Long-term debt ratio in the whole
period. Nonetheless, in the regression for the sample under IAS/IFRS, after 2005,
Product Diversification is not statistical significant in the three Leverage measures,
being the IAS/IFRS transition a possible explanation for the unexpected result achieved
in the Long-term debt ratio regression.
Regarding Geographic Diversification, its non-linearity was confirmed for Total Debt
and Short-term Debt Ratio regressions, being reported an inverted U-shape relationship
with Geographic Diversification for Total Debt and Short-term Debt Ratios. As
predicted, the empirical evidence tends to corroborate the formulated research
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hypothesis, H2, for Total Debt and Short-term Debt Ratio regressions, having the
SRGEODIV a negative signal.
Our findings contrast with the results reported by Barton and Gordon (1988), Singh, et
al. (2003) and Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004), who found significant relationships
between Leverage and diversification variables. Nonetheless, Product Diversification
appears with no explanatory power of listed Portuguese companies’ capital structure,
similarly to the result obtain in Menendez-Alonso (2003) for Spanish companies.
Despite this, a non-linear inverted U-shape relationship between Short-term Debt Ratio
and Geographic Diversification is consistent with Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004).
Regarding the control variables included in the study, for the three Debt Ratios, the
findings included in Table 7 diverge among dependent variables, being presented as
follows.
Total Debt Ratio Regression and Control Variables
The Total Debt Ratio appears negatively correlated, as predicted, with Profitability,
Growth Opportunities and Managerial Efficiency. Comparing with the results for the
period 2005 – 2013 (Appendix 5), this last variable appears not statistically significant.
The dummy variable to control the impact of 2008 Financial Crisis in Leverage, presents
a significant level, expressing a positive relationship between Total Debt Ratio and the
2008 Financial Crisis.
Long-term Debt Ratio Regression and Control Variables
Analysing Long-term Debt Ratio, this dependent variable is negatively correlated, as
expected, with Growth Opportunities and Managerial Efficiency, being identical results
reported for the sample in the period of 2005 – 2013, as tabulated in Appendix 5.
On the other hand, Asset Tangibility coefficient shows a different sign compared to the
expected, being Long-term Debt Ratio negatively correlated with the independent
variable. This finding is contrarian to our prediction and might be the result of the
significant changes that occurred with the IAS/IFRS transition, specifically regarding
Property, Plant and Equipment, since this coefficient is not statistical significant in the
regression presented in Appendix 5 for the sample after 2005.
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Profitability, measured by Return on Assets, a ratio largely affected by the IAS/IFRS
transition (Costa and Lopes, 2010), presents only for the sample after 2005 a negative
statistical significant relationship, as predicted, with Long-term Debt Ratio.
Firm Size is statistical significant, presenting a positive relationship with Long-term
Debt. As previously discussed, Total Assets were also reported as a financial statement
line significantly impacted by the IAS/IFRS transition, although, this finding prevails in
the regression for 2005 – 2013.
Another important finding is the significant statistical relationship with Long-term Debt
Ratio and the 2008 Financial Crisis, being the dummy variable positive correlated.
Short-term Debt Ratio Regression and Control Variables
Regardless of the periods analysed, 2003 – 2013 or isolating 2005 – 2013, Short-term
Debt Ratio is negatively correlated with Profitability and Growth Opportunities. Asset
Tangibility presents a positive coefficient signal. These findings follow our predictions
expressed in section 4.
Regarding Firm Size, it is negatively correlated, for the whole sample. However, our
predictions expressed in section 4 are that Leverage is positively correlated with Firm
Size, because larger companies may reduce the transaction and agency costs of Debt
than small ones. Nonetheless, the results presented indicate that Firm Size might allow
access to debt with larger maturities, reducing the Short-term Debt usage.
The evidence collected does not corroborate our prediction on Managerial Efficiency,
for the period after 2005. The positive coefficient might be justified by the fact that
Short-term Debt represents a smaller slice of the capital structure and its obligations end
or are renewed within one year, being a non effective managerial constraint device, as
could be Long-term Debt. On these grounds, Long-term Debt Ratio regression
confirmed our expectations, being Long-term Debt Ratios smaller for more efficient
firms. However, this decrease on Leverage could not be completely offset with equity
financing, generating and increase in Short-term Debt Ratios.
Summary
In summary, Table 8 shows the predicted and observed signal for each of the variable
for the three variant models reported in Table 7.
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Table 8: Expected and observed signal by variable.
Hypotheses / Variables Short Representation ExpectedSignal TDR LTDR STDR
Explanatory Variables
H1 Product Diversification PRODDIV + NS - NS
H2 Geographic Diversification GEODIV and SRGEODIV - - NS -
Control Variables
Profitability PROF - - NS -
Asset Tangibility TANG + NS - +
Firm Size SIZE + NS + -
Growth opportunities GROWTH - - - -
Managerial Efficiency EFFICIENCY - - - NS
Notes:
NS – not supported. Hypotheses definition is presented in section 4.
Dependent Variables - TDR: Total Debt Ratio; LTDR: Long-term Debt Ratio; STDR: Short-term Debt Ratio.
The empirical evidence collected in terms of Profitability for Total Debt Ratio and
Short-term Debt Ratio is similar to the findings of Barton and Gordon (1988), Kochhar
and Hitt (1998), Singh, et al. (2003), Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) and Frank and
Goyal (2009).
Asset Tangibility in Barton and Gordon (1988) study also was reported as being not
statistical significant. Despite this, the positive relationship in the Short-term Debt Ratio
regression was also found in Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) and Frank and Goyal
(2009).
The positive relationship between Long-term Debt Ratio and Firm Size is coincident
with the findings in Kochhar and Hitt (1998), Singh, et al. (2003) and Frank and Goyal
(2009).
Regarding Growth opportunities, measured by Market-to-book ratio, the negative
coefficient for all the three regressions complies with the relationships reported between
Leverage and this indicator in Frank and Goyal (2009).
The negative signal of Managerial Efficiency for the regressions with Total Debt Ratio
and Long-term Debt as dependent variable is also stated in Singh, et al. (2003).
6.2.2 Additional Analysis - Impact of 2008 Financial Crisis
Following the significant level found in the dummy variable evaluating the impact of
2008 Financial Crisis in Total Debt Ratio and Long-term Debt Ratio regressions, we
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further explored whether the 2008 Financial Crisis period had an incremental effect on
our global findings.
For that purpose, the equation (4.1) was regressed splitting the sample in two periods,
before and after the financial crisis. We assumed the crisis began in 2008 (Grouhy, et
al., 2008). This allowed us to test the differentiating effects of the current financial
crisis. Table 9 presents the results for the variable Long-term Debt Ratio, being Total
Debt Ratio regression not tabulated for the sake of parsimony, but with similar results.
As noted in Table 9, prior and post financial crisis, Product Diversification has no
explanatory power in determining Long-term Debt Ratio. On the other hand, in the
period of financial crisis, Long-term Debt presents a negative non-linear relationship
with Geographic Diversification.
Profitability in the period after financial crisis exhibits a negative sign, as expected;
although, Profitability does not present a significant coefficient in the regression prior
financial crisis.
Asset Tangibility in the model with the total sample has an unexpected relationship with
Leverage, presenting a negative significant coefficient; although, in the models reported
in Table 9, it appears with no level of significance for both regressions after and prior
2008.
Long-term Debt Ratio exhibits a positive correlation with Firm Size for the period after
2008, having no significant statistical relationship before the 2008.
Regarding Growth Opportunities and Managerial Efficiency, it appears that Leverage is
negative correlated in both periods.
In summary, before the financial crisis, only Growth Opportunities and Managerial
Efficiency expressed a significant relationship with Long-term Debt; after 2008,
Profitability and Firm Size have additional explanatory power, being also presented an
inverted U-shape relationship with Geographic Diversification. Considering the whole
sample, the major difference is the significance of Asset Tangibility, not confirmed in
the periods before and after crisis (coefficients not statistically significant).
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Table 9: Regression Results of the Model (4.1) splitting the sample before and after 2008 financial
crisis for the dependent variable Long-term Debt Ratio.
The table reports results of regressions regarding the long-term debt ratio - long-term debt to the sum of
total debt and market capitalization ratio - using the explanatory variables presented in the third section
and splitting the sample into two periods – before and after 2008.
Independent Variables Expected Signal
Long-term Debt Ratio
2003 - 2007 2008 - 2013 2003 - 2013
Explanatory Variables
PRODDIV + -0.01 -0.02 -0.05*(-0.36) (-0.44) (-1.87)
GEODIV ? 0.03 0.15* 0.03(0.31) (1.66) (0.44)
SRGEODIV - -0.01 -0.09* 0.00(-0.22) (-1.91) (-0.11)
Control Variables
PROF - -0.01 -0.53** -0.21(-0.05) (-2.7) (-1.31)
TANG + 0.09 -0.09 -0.17**(0.7) (-1.16) (-2.35)
SIZE + 0.03 0.09*** 0.08***(0.78) (3.29) (3.12)
GROWTH - -0.08** -0.09* -0.09***(-2.76) (-1.77) (-3.59)
EFFICIENCY - -0.11** -0.15*** -0.15***(-2.2) (-3.46) (-4.18)
DFC2008 ?
0.04**
(2.27)
R2 18% 34% 36%
Adjusted R2 10% 29% 33%
F-statistic 2.27 6.84 11.97
Prob(F-statistic) 0.030 0.000 0.000
Observations 90 113 203
Method Random Effect Random Effect Random Effect
Notes:
T-statistics are given bellow the coefficients estimates in parenthesis. ***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The Hausman Test, reported in Appendix 2, was performed, being the null hypothesis not rejected for all
three models, i.e., the random effect estimator is more adequate than the fixed effect.
Dependent Variables - LTDR: Long-term Debt Ratio.
Independent Variables – PRODDIV: Product Diversification; GEODIV: Geographic Diversification;
PROF: Profitability; TANG: Asset Tangibility; GROWTH: Growth opportunities; EFFICIENCY:
Managerial Efficiency; DFC2008: dummy variable which assumes 1 if 2008 financial crisis is present, i.e.
if the years are from 2008 until 2013 and 0 otherwise.
Results for 2003 – 2013 have been previously presented in Table 7.
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The results suggest that for Portuguese listed companies, Diversification Strategies have
low explanatory power. Our findings contradict our expectations formulated in H1,
which concerns Product Diversification.
Regarding non-linearities of Leverage and Geographic Diversification, we supported
and inverted U-shape relationship in the Total Debt Ratio and Short-term Debt Ratio
regressions, as formulated in H2. This last finding was also corroborated in the
regression of Long-term Debt Ratio, only for the period of 2008 Financial Crisis.
6.3 Robustness Tests
To test the results obtain in the previous section and complementing the empirical
analysis, we performed a few sensitivity analyses. For the sake of parsimony, some of
the results were not tabulated.
Firstly, we re-estimate the model (4.1), using an alternative deflator for the dependent
variables. Secondly, likewise Singh, et al. (2003), we controlled the effect of Dual
Diversification strategies. Finally, the model was regressed with elimination of outliers.
6.3.1 Alternative Measure of Leverage
Aligned with previous studies, (Singh, et al., 2003; Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004;
Frank and Goyal, 2009) we used the Total Assets as an alternative deflator for the
Leverage ratios, instead of the sum of Debt and Market Capitalization, comparing with
the original results in section 6.2.
The Appendix 6 includes the regressions for the equation (4.1), using as dependent
variables ratios computed with Total Assets deflator.
In the Total Debt Ratio regression, the most meaningful difference is regarding
Geographic Diversification, since the non-linearity previously exposed is not supported.
Regarding Long-term Debt Ratio regression, it appears negatively correlated with Firm
Size, contrarian to previous results and also our expectations. However, we re-estimate
the regression restricting the sample with observations after 2005, due to IAS/IFRS
transition, being Firm Size coefficient not significant.
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Considering Short-term Debt Ratio, Firm Size is not statistical significant, contrarian to
the previous results.
6.3.2 Effect of Dual Diversification Strategy
Product and Geographic Diversification may interact, since one firm could employ a
Dual Diversification strategy. As such, we further explored whether that strategy has an
impact on our results constructing the model (6.1), introducing the variable
PRODDIV*GEODIV, to capture the effect of a Dual Diversification strategy, as
detailed:
ࡸࡱࢂ࢏࢚= ઺૙ + ઺૚ ∗ ۾܀۽۲۲۷܄࢏࢚+ ઺૛ ∗ ۵۳۽۲۷܄࢏࢚+ ઺૜ ∗ (۾܀۽۲۲۷܄ ∗ ۵۳۽۲۷܄)࢏࢚+ ઺૝ ∗ ۾܀۽۴࢏࢚+ ઺૞ ∗ ܂ۯۼ۵࢏࢚+ ઺૟ ∗ ܁۷܈۳࢏࢚+ ઺ૠ ∗ ۵܀۽܅ ܂۶࢏࢚+ ઺ૡ ∗ ۳۴۴۷۱۷۳ۼ۱܇࢏࢚+ ࢿ࢏࢚ (6.1)
The new variable presents a significant statistical relationship for Long-term Debt and
Short-term Debt Ratio regressions. Regarding Long-term Debt Ratio, the coefficient of
the new variable is positive, although, GEODIV and PRODDIV have a negative
coefficient, both with statistical significance. Singh, et al. (2003) also reported a
positive impact of Dual Diversification strategies on Leverage.
Analysing the Short-term Debt Ratio regression, the coefficient of the new variable is
negative, being GEODIV and PRODDIV positive and also with statistical significance.
Taking into account Agency Costs theories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the results for
Short-term Debt Ratio seem to confirm that firms with more disperse activities increase
their monitoring costs and also information asymmetries, implying higher costs of debt,
and consequently, reducing its use. Wherefore, accordant with our findings, a Dual
Diversification strategy impacts negatively the Shor-term Debt Ratio.
6.3.3 Sensitivity Test to Outliers
Recalling the results of the univariate analysis, the variable that exhibits more extreme
observations is Profitability, since the lag between the minimum and maximum was
high and the standard deviation is equal or above the mean for each Panel exposed in
the section 5. Considering this, the extreme observations of Profitability were
eliminated, excluding 45 observations. The outliers were identified using the frequency
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distribution of the sample, eliminating observation with Profitability above 0.1 and
below 0.
The equation (4.1) was estimated for the restricted sample, being most of the results
consistent with the previous ones exposed in the multivariate analysis. Notwithstanding,
the inverted U-shape relationship with Geographic Diversification in Total Debt Ratio
regression is not supported.
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7. Conclusion
In this section we will start by presenting the main results achieved in this empirical
investigation. Then, we will discuss some study limitations, being the last section
dedicated to possible paths of further investigation in this field.
7.1 Discussion of results
The issue of measuring the determinants of capital structure has been discussed for
decades.
The main purpose of this study was to discuss the impact of Diversification Strategies in
the Capital Structure of Portuguese companies listed on Euronext Lisbon.
The capital structure choice is the result of several determinants, and there is not a
single theoretical perspective capable of capture all the important aspects in this
complex process. In order to update the financial paradigm and incorporate a new
perspective in the capital structure decision, we suggest that corporate strategies,
particular the diversification ones, are some of the potential explanations for the firms’
financial resources.
Based on a sample of 35 Portuguese companies listed on Euronext Lisbon for the time
period 2003 to 2013, we investigated the impact on Leverage of Product and
Geographic Diversification, and several control variables, such as Profitability, Asset
Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth Opportunities and Managerial Efficiency.
Our findings suggest that Product Diversification strategies have no impact on the
Leverage ratios of the Portuguese companies, contrarian as expected. Regarding
Geographic Diversification, Total Debt Ratio and Short-term Debt Ratio feature an
inverted U-shape relationship with Geographic Diversification, being positively
correlated in the first stages of diversification and negatively correlated in a more
mature phase of the geographic expansion. However, in some of the robustness test
performed, Geographic Diversification is not statistically significant in the Total Debt
Ratio regressions, being the previous findings held for Short-term Debt Ratio.
49
The findings suggesting a non-linear relationship of Leverage with Geographic
Diversification are consistent with the fact that firms in initial stages of expansion have
restrains to equity issues, but in a more mature phase, other sources of financing will be
available, replacing Leverage (Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004).
After controlling the effect of the 2008 Financial Crisis in the models, most of the
results previously achieved remained. In the period under the effect of 2008 Financial
Crisis, Long-term Debt also exhibits an inverted U-shape relationship with Geographic
Diversification.
Considering a Dual Diversification Strategy, Short-term Debt Ratio is negatively
affected when a company has simultaneous Product and Geographic Strategies,
enhancing the effect of Agency costs of disperse activities on the debt level (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). However, Long-term Debt Ratio is positively affected by a Dual
Diversification strategy, as it was found by Singh, et al. (2003).
Our study makes some contributions to the existing literature that addresses the capital
structure study of Portuguese listed companies.
Firstly, it brings the issue of the determinants of capital structure for the Portuguese
listed companies. Secondly, highlights the impact of Diversification strategies in capital
structure, enriching the current literature with some diverging findings from the
previous empirical studies.
Our findings are relevant to suggest that contrarian to previous studies for American
companies (Barton and Gordon, 1988; Kochhar and Hitt, 1998; Singh, et al., 2003)
Product Diversification strategies have low explanatory power of Leverage for listed
Portuguese companies. However, the results are similar to the ones achieves by
Menendez-Alonso (2003) for a sample of Spanish companies.
We also found evidence to support an inverted U-shape relationship between Leverage
and Geographic Diversification, as reported by Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004).
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7.2 Limitations
This study presents some limitations. The first one is regarding the small sample size,
due to small number of listed Portuguese companies and available data, which could
affect the statistical inference and consequentially the results.
A second limitation is related with the quality of sales segment report for the companies
in analysis. The accuracy of those divulgations, disclosures and the definition of
segments, independently of the accounting standard, is a managerial choice, impacting
the quality of the report (Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2015) and consequentially, the
Diversification Indexes measure.
Another limitation is the possible Reverse Causality between Leverage and
Diversification. The presence of Endogeneity could generate bias in estimates, i.e. reject
a hypothesis that is in fact true and do not reject a hypothesis that is in fact false.
7.3 Future Research
A possible development is applying the research to a more extent sample and other
geographic areas. Most of the studies developed are for samples before the financial
crisis and for companies from United States and some European countries.
Other further investigation, as suggested by Menendez-Alonso (2003) and also
developed Joliet and Muller (2013) involves studying the impact of the change in the
diversification strategy scope in the capital structure of the firm, implying a more
extensive data collection.
Another potential line of research might be to study the impact of focalization process
on Leverage, comparing with the results of the opposite diversification approach.
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Appendixes
Appendix 1 Entropy Measure of Diversification
The Entropy Measure of Diversification suggested by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) is
calculated as follows: ௜ܲ is the share of the ith business segment’s sales as a percent of
total firm sales and n is the number of the firm’s business segments:
ܶ݋ܽݐ ݈ܦ ݅݁ݒ ݎ݅ݏ ݂݅ ܿܽ ݅ݐ݋݊ =෍ ௜݈ܲ݊ 1ܲ
௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
Appendix 2 Hausman Test
This test is a generally accepted method to choose between fixed and random effect
model (Hausman, 1978).
ܪ = ൫ܾ෠ிா − ෠ܾோா൯ᇱ൫ܸ෠ிா − ෠ܸோா൯ିଵ൫ܾ෠ிா − ෠ܾோா൯~߯௞ଶ
࢈෡ࡲࡱ is the vector of estimators of the model with fixed effects;
࢈෡ࡾࡱ is the vector of estimators of the model with random effects;
ࢂ෡ࡲࡱ is the matrix of variances-covariance of the estimator ෠ܾிா;
ࢂ෡ࡾࡱ is the matrix of variances-covariance of the estimator ෠ܾோா;
k is the number of regression coefficients.
The Hausman test tests the null-hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the
random effects estimator are adequate, against the alternative hypothesis of correlation
between the individual unobservable effects and independent variables, being fixed
effect estimator more adequate.
If ܪ >߯௞ଶ or p-value < 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected, implying that fixed effect
model is more adequate.
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Appendix 3 Correlation matrix with Dependent variable Long-term Debt Ratio
LONG-TERM
DEBT RATIO
PROD
DIV
GEO
DIV PROF TANG SIZE GROWTH
EFFICIEN
CY
LONG-TERM
DEBT RATIO 1.00
PROD_DIV 0.07 1.00
GEO_DIV 0.19*** -0.07 1.00
PROF -0.16 -0.10 0.03 1.00
TANG 0.10 -0.23*** 0.31*** 0.23*** 1.00
SIZE 0.40*** 0.12* 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 1.00
GROWTH -0.40*** -0.07 -0.12* 0.10 0.10 -0.05 1.00
EFFICIENCY -0.53*** -0.22*** -0.10 0.30*** 0.04 -0.13* 0.38*** 1.00
Notes:
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. LEV represents the dependent variable
Leverage, measured through the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of total debt plus market capitalization.
Independent Variables – PRODDIV: Product Diversification; GEODIV: Geographic Diversification; PROF:
Profitability; TANG: Asset Tangibility; GROWTH: Growth Opportunities; EFFICIENCY: Managerial Efficiency.
Appendix 4 Correlation matrix with Dependent variable Short-term Debt Ratio
SHORT-TERM
DEBT RATIO
PROD
DIV
GEO
DIV PROF TANG SIZE GROWTH
EFFICIE
NCY
SHORT-TERM
DEBT RATIO 1.00
PROD_DIV -0.04 1.00
GEO_DIV -0.08 -0.07 1.00
PROF -0.40*** -0.10 0.03 1.00
TANG -0.05 -0.23*** 0.31*** 0.23*** 1.00
SIZE -0.31*** 0.12* 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 1.00
GROWTH -0.35*** -0.07 -0.12* 0.10 0.10 -0.05 1.00
EFFICIENCY -0.09 -0.22*** -0.10 0.30*** 0.04 -0.13* 0.38*** 1.00
Notes:
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. LEV represents the dependent variable
Leverage, measured through the ratio of short-term debt to the sum of total debt plus market capitalization.
Independent Variables – PRODDIV: Product Diversification; GEODIV: Geographic Diversification; PROF:
Profitability; TANG: Asset Tangibility; GROWTH: Growth Opportunities; EFFICIENCY: Managerial Efficiency.
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Appendix 5 Regression Results of Models (4.1), for the period 2005 – 2013
The table reports results of regressions regarding the three debt ratios – total debt to the sum of total debt
and market capitalization ratio; long-term debt to the sum of total debt and market capitalization ratio and
short-term debt to the sum of total debt and market capitalization ratio - using the explanatory variables
presented in the section 4. The sample period is from 2005 until 2013.
Independent Variables Expected Signal
Leverage (Dependent Variables)
TDR LTDR STDR
Explanatory Variables
PRODDIV + 0.02 -0.03 0.03(0.49) (-1) (1.08)
GEODIV ? 0.27** 0.10 0.14(2.42) (1.32) (1.12)
SRGEODIV - -0.14*** -0.04 -0.09*(-3.09) (-1.03) (-1.85)
Control Variables
PROF - -0.87*** -0.36* -0.62***(-4.23) (-1.93) (-4.32)
TANG + 0.03 -0.08 0.16**(0.27) (-1.12) (2.49)
SIZE + 0.11 0.08*** 0.18(1.04) (3) (1.06)
GROWTH - -0.21*** -0.08** -0.12***(-6.44) (-2.73) (-3.05)
EFFICIENCY - 0.01 -0.13*** 0.16***(0.07) (-3.46) (3.66)
DFC2008 ?
0.05** 0.05** -0.01
(2.25) (2.36) (-0.24)
R2 88% 37% 76%
Adjusted R2 83% 33% 68%
F-statistic 20.37 10.18 9.13
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 166
Periods 2005 - 2013
Method Fixed Effect Random Effect Fixed Effect
Notes:
T-statistics are given bellow the coefficients estimates in parenthesis. ***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The Hausman Test, reported in Appendix 2, was performed, being the null hypothesis rejected for Total
Debt and Short-term Debt regressions, i.e., the fixed effect estimator is more adequate than the random
effect. Regarding Long-term Debt Ratio regression, the null hypothesis was not rejected, being the
random effect estimator more adequate.
Dependent Variables - TDR: Total Debt Ratio; LTDR: Long-term Debt Ratio; STDR: Short-term Debt
Ratio.
Independent Variables – PRODDIV: Product Diversification; GEODIV: Geographic Diversification;
SRGEODIV: Square Ratio of Geographic Diversification; PROF: Profitability; TANG: Asset Tangibility;
GROWTH: Growth opportunities; EFFICIENCY: Managerial Efficiency; DFC2008: dummy variable
which assumes 1 if 2008 financial crisis is present, i.e. if the years are from 2008 until 2013 and 0
otherwise.
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Appendix 6 Regression Results of Model (4.1) for the total sample, for the period
2003 – 2013, using different Dependent Variables
The table reports results of regressions regarding the three debt ratios – total debt to total assets ratio;
long-term debt to total assets ratio and short-term debt to total assets ratio - using the explanatory
variables presented in the section 4.
Independent Variables Expected Signal
Leverage (Dependent Variables)
TDR LTDR STDR
Explanatory Variables
PRODDIV + 0.02 0.00 0.03(1.11) (-0.04) (1.38)
GEODIV ? 0.04 0.03 0.05(0.64) (0.42) (1.04)
SRGEODIV - -0.04 0.01 -0.06**(-1.33) (0.21) (-2.26)
Control Variables
PROF - -1.01*** -0.02 -0.92***(-7.56) (-0.15) (-7.05)
TANG + 0.07 -0.16** 0.20***(1.12) (-2.18) (3.53)
SIZE + 0.01 -0.22*** -0.03(0.34) (-3.52) (-1.38)
GROWTH - -0.01 0.03 -0.04***(-0.53) (1.06) (-2.08)
EFFICIENCY - -0.13*** -0.34*** 0.04(-3.56) (-6.04) (1.43)
DFC2008 ?
0.00 0.04** -0.01
(-0.19) (2.12) (-0.84)
R2 31% 76% 31%
Adjusted R2 28% 70% 27%
F-statistic 9.63 12.02 9.43
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 203
Periods 2003 - 2013
Method Random Effect Fixed Effect Random Effect
Notes:
T-statistics are given bellow the coefficients estimates in parenthesis. ***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The Hausman Test, reported in Appendix 2, was performed, being the null hypothesis not rejected for
Total Debt and Short-term Debt regressions, i.e., the random effect estimator is more adequate than the
fixed effect. Regarding Long-term Debt Ratio regression, the null hypothesis was rejected, being the fixed
effect estimator more adequate.
Dependent Variables - TDR: Total Debt Ratio; LTDR: Long-term Debt Ratio; STDR: Short-term Debt
Ratio.
Independent Variables – PRODDIV: Product Diversification; GEODIV: Geographic Diversification;
SRGEODIV: Square Ratio of Geographic Diversification; PROF: Profitability; TANG: Asset Tangibility;
GROWTH: Growth opportunities; EFFICIENCY: Managerial Efficiency; DFC2008: dummy variable
which assumes 1 if 2008 financial crisis is present, i.e. if the years are from 2008 until 2013 and 0
otherwise.
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Annexes
Annex 1 Companies included in the study
# Company SIC Code Industry
1 Altri SGPS S.A. 2611 Pulp Mills
2 Cimpor-Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS, S.A. 3241 Cement, Hydraulic
3 Cofina SGPS, S.A. 2711 Newspapers
4 Copam-Companhia Portuguesa de Amidos S.A. 2046 Wet Corn Milling
5 Corticeira Amorim SGPS S.A. 2499 Wood Products
6 Edp - Energias de Portugal, S.A. 4911 Electric Services
7 Estoril Sol, SGPS., S.A. 7999 Amusement And Recreation
8 F. Ramada - Investimentos, SGPS, S.A. 3316 Cold Finishing Of Steel Shapes
9 Galp Energia, SGPS., S.A. 2911 Petroleum Refining
10 Glintt - Global Intelligent Technologies, S.A. 7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design
11 Ibersol, sgps, S.A. 5812 Eating Places
12 Imobiliaria Construtora Grao Para, S.A. 7011 Hotels And Motels
13 Impresa - sociedade gestora de participacoessociais, S.A. 4833 Television Broadcasting Stations
14 Inapa - investimentos, participaçoes e gestao,S.A. 5111 Printing And Writing Paper
15 Jeronimo Martins S.A. 5411 Grocery Stores
16 Litho Formas Portuguesa - Impressos Continuos eMultiplos, S.A. 2752 Commercial Printing, Lithographic
17 Martifer sgps, S.A. 1629 Heavy Construction
18 Mota-engil SGPS S.A. 1611 Highway And Street Construction
19 Nos SGPS S.A. 4841 Cable And Other Pay Television Services
20 Novabase SGPS S.A. 7371 Custom Computer Programming Services
21 Pharol SGPS S.A. 4812 Radiotelephone Communication
22 Portucel S.A. 2621 Paper Mills
23 Reditus - SGPS S.A. 7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design
24 Ren - Redes Energéticas Nacionais, SGPS, S.A. 4911 Electric Services
25 Sag Gest Solucões Automóvel Globais SGPSS.A. 5012 Automobiles And Other Motor Vehicles
26 Sdc – Investimentos SGPS S.A. 1611 Highway And Street Construction
27 Semapa Sociedade de Investimento e Gestão,SGPS, S.A. 2621 Paper Mills
28 Sonae Industria - SGPS, S.A. 2493 Reconstituted Wood Products
29 Sonae - SGPS, S.A. 5411 Grocery Stores
30 Sonae.com, SGPS, S.A. 4812 Radiotelephone Communication
31 Sonagi - Sociedade Nacional de Gestao eInvestimento, S.A. 6512 Nonresidential Building Operators
32 Sumol+compal, S.A. 2033 Canned Fruits And Specialties
33 Teixeira Duarte, S.A. 1611 Highway And Street Construction
34 Toyota Caetano Portugal, S.A. 3711 Motor Vehicles And Car Bodies
35 VAA-Vista Alegre Atlantis SGPS S.A. 3269 Pottery Products
